Citizenship in Turkey is one of the major instruments of nation-building. The legal framework that Turkish citizenship rests on is universal and equal. The non-Muslim minorities – the Armenians, the Greeks and the Jews – however are granted special group rights in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Despite the protection of minorities and their rights in the treaty, the non-Muslim minorities, from time to time, had been superseded by the universal norms of citizenship in Turkey. This study discusses the history of the Jewish minority with a focus on the development of citizenship in Turkey. The history of the Jews as a minority group and as citizens is illustrated by way of a chronological methodology encompassing a broad range of events, laws, ideas and movements spanning Early Republican Period up to present-day Turkey. In line with the conventional classification utilized by many studies of Turkish politics, the historical projection developed on the citizenship and minority status of Jews in Turkey is categorized into three periods: the Early Republican Period (1923–1945), the Multi-Party Democracy Period (1945–1980) and the Post-1980 Period covering more recent developments.
universal rights and responsibilities (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 1–2). This tension marks the governance problems that contemporary democracies face elicited by the discord between the principles of equality and difference, and between the concepts of majority and minority (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000).³

The Turkish state, having a republican tradition and carrying a certain level of cultural diversity, encounters the modern tension between equality and difference. On the one hand, having roots in the Ottoman Empire Millet system, there are legally recognized non-Muslim minorities in Turkey like the Armenians, Greeks and the Jews as well as other sociologically recognized ethnic/cultural groups like Alawites, Kurds, Lazs, Circassians, Georgians, etc. some of whom are deemed specific rights pertaining to their groups. On the other hand, due to a strong state tradition (Heper, 1985), citizenship in Turkey refers more to equal rights and responsibilities like paying taxes, performing military service and voting, entitled as positive freedoms in republicanism. Thus, we can speak about the dominancy of the rhetoric of equality concept in Turkey underlined by the unitary, republican state structure and uniform society despite religious, ethnic and cultural diversities and differences in the society.

The status of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey is worthy of special contemplation with regards to Turkish citizenship. The Greeks, the Armenians and the Jews are the only groups that have acquired the status of minority who were also acknowledged as “Millet” previously in the Ottoman period.⁴ Albeit on religious basis, they are the only groups in Turkey recognized as minorities by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and have been granted special rights accordingly.⁵ These rights incorporate the freedoms of living, religious beliefs and migration, the rights of legal and political equality, using their mother tongue in the courts, opening their own schools or similar institutions and the holding of religious ceremonies. In this regard, the status of officially recognized minorities poses a complexity on the hegemonic understanding of citizenship in Turkey which tends more for “equal” citizenship rather than a “differentiated” citizenship. The spirit in Lausanne regarding the protection of the three specified non-Muslim communities was overridden by the universal conceptualization of citizenship. By the same token, the non-Muslim minorities’ position got marginalized. It was in this context that there has been a discrepancy between the de jure and de facto notions of minority rights and protection. The protectionist framework of Lausanne was not strengthened by some other laws and legislations of universal citizenship. Hence, the actual practice differed from the actual legal rhetoric on protection of minorities. One can trace the discrepancy between the
rights granted in the Lausanne Treaty and shortcomings of the minority treatment in the community histories of each non-Muslim group.

The three legally-recognized minority groups – the Armenians, the Greeks and the Jews – have specific group characteristics which differentiate them not from other socio-cultural groups in the Turkish society but also from each other. For instance, in population terms, Jews had always illustrated smaller population figures than the Armenians and the Greeks. Today, community sources count no more than 50,000 Armenian, 27,000 Jewish and 3,000 Greek minorities living in Turkey constituting less than 0.1% of the total population of around 70 million (Dündar 2000: 138). However, back in 1919, on the eve of the Independence War, the Turkish official sources confirmed that there were 543,000 Armenians, 1,015,000 Greeks and 93,000 Jews living in Anatolia altogether constituting 15% of the total population of around 11 million (Selek 1987: 64). The historical significance of the Armenian and Greek populations in Anatolia had served as grounds for the territorial claims and the separation of Anatolia by the Western delegates to the negotiations at the Lausanne Treaty which were not accepted by the Turkish representatives (Ürer, 2003: 240).

Naturally, alongside these socio-cultural and demographic differences among the three non-Muslim minorities, there are differences in historical experience as well. The Jewish minority had better relations with the Turkish state officials than the Armenians and the Greeks. The Jewish elite did not pursue politics of territorial separation whereas the Greek and the Armenian elite, specifically the religious authorities of these minorities did during the War of Independence. Furthermore, the relations between Turkey and Israel followed a smooth and cooperative pattern since the establishment of Israel which in return contributed to the traditional “loyal” image of the Jewish minority. However, the tense relations between Turkey-Greece due to the conflict over Cyprus, the Aegean Islands, the status of the Greek Patriarchy and the treatment of the Turkish minority in Greek Western Thrace brought pressures on the Greek minority living in Turkey (Macar, 2003). Similarly, in the case of the Armenian minority, the continuous claims by Armenia for Turkey to recognize Armenian genocide plus the ASALA (the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s did not contribute to the peaceful existence of the Armenian minority living in Turkey.

However, the conduct of Turkish citizenship was not determined by the case-specific histories of each minority group. The development of Turkish citizenship followed “equality” in principle for all
citizens of Turkey – both Muslim and non-Muslim – and the consequent policies did not differentiate between the three non-Muslim communities. In other words, despite the significant historical differences between the Armenians, the Greeks and the Jews, the evolving concept of citizenship in Turkey and its influence on the minorities apply to all three groups. It was in this context that the Jewish minority, regardless of its notorious “loyal” group label, “harmonious” relations with the official authorities, and “functional” role as a link to the perceived power of the American Jewish lobby, was put under equal footing with other non-Muslim groups. Their inclusion in the definition of “Turk” was still problematic and they were influenced from the discrepancy between *de jure* and *de facto* notions of Turkish citizenship from time to time. Therefore, a focus on the Jewish minority in the development of Turkish citizenship enables to exemplify not only the significance of the category of loyalty in Turkish citizenship and the conduct of minorities per se but also the insufficiency of the same concept of loyalty to legitimize non-Muslim minorities’ inclusion in the definition of the Turk.

This article undertakes the task of highlighting the development of Turkish citizenship and the conduct of the minorities in the case of the Jewish minority. The article aims to revisit the history of Jewish minority in Turkey with a special focus on citizenship as a concept and a construction. It portrays the specific history of this specific group in terms of not only the happenings that affected the Jewish minority per se but also how the community responded to those happenings. The history of the Jews as a minority group and as citizens is illustrated by way of a chronological methodology encompassing a broad range of events, laws, ideas and movements spanning Early Republican Period up to present-day Turkey. In line with the conventional classification utilized by many studies of Turkish politics, the historical projection developed on the citizenship and minority status of Jews in Turkey is categorized into three periods: the Early Republican Period (1923–1945), the Multi-Party Democracy Period (1945–1980) and the Post-1980 Period covering more recent developments.6

**The Early Republican Period (1923–1945): Jews vis-à-vis nation-building process**

The foremost change after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Turkey with regards to non-Muslim groups took place in the legal framework. The Republican People’s Party (RPP), which until 1946 dominated Turkey as its sole political party, not only set the fundamentals of modern Turkey during the Early
Republican Period but also established the initial legislation on non-Muslim minorities. The Treaty of Lausanne covered a broad range of general issues, but Articles 37–45 specifically regulated the status and rights of non-Muslims – the Armenians, Greeks and Jews – living in Turkey. Accordingly, only three non-Muslim groups – the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, who made up the Ottoman Empire’s major non-Muslim Millets – were recognized as minorities, and therefore were granted the same freedoms as other Turkish nationals of life, religious belief and migration, plus the rights of legal and political equality and to use their mother tongue in courts, found schools or similar institutions, and hold religious ceremonies. The articles granted these three non-Muslim groups the right to use their own language, the right of political and civic equality, the right to establish religious, educational and social welfare institutions, and the freedom of religion, travel and migration.

With respect to citizenship, Article 88 of the Constitution stated (Gözübüyük, 1995: 76): “The people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race are Turkish in terms of citizenship.” Despite national legislation such as the adoption of the Constitution in 1924 and the Civic Code in 1926, minority issues were regulated by special clauses in Lausanne, which was conceived as a handicap to the social homogenization and nation-building aims of the new state (Bali, 2000: 62). The dominant ideology at the time was national interest supplemented by unity and collective purpose (Ayata, 1992). Therefore, the special rights granted in the Treaty of Lausanne gave rise to enmity against minorities in the eyes of the public. For instance, between 1923 and 1927, non-Muslims were discharged from their positions in state offices and state-owned companies (Levi, 1998: 37). Furthermore, non-Muslims were expected to willingly opt out of the articles on minorities in Lausanne. The Jews were the first to opt out and on September 15, 1925 the committee of the Jewish minority declared that it had opted out of Lausanne’s Article 42 (Galanti, 1995: 73). Under Article 42, the family laws and customs of minorities were protected. For every minority group, a committee was formed with an equal number of representatives from the group and the Turkish government. With resignation, the Jewish committee that would have a role in the settlement of questions in accordance with the family law and customs of the Jewish minority was abandoned.

The opting out hastened the retreat of the authority of the Chief Rabbinate over the Jewish community and its representative power in relations with the Turkish government. The Chief Rabbinate was already pacified due to the 1925 Law on Order passed during the Kurdish rebellions in the east. In the same year, the rabbinate’s
revenues fell with the prohibitions on its authority to collect tax from the Jewish community for licensing kosher food (Bali, 2000: 55). It was only a year later that the Chief Rabbinate was allowed to collect taxes from the community. With the passage of the Law on Secularism in 1928, the role of the Chief Rabbinate as a mediator between the Jewish community and the state was further weakened. As secularism became one of the cornerstones of Republican Turkey, any connotation of religious communal identification in the public sphere, either Muslim or non-Muslim, was strictly forbidden. According to Law on Attire No. 2596, attire worn for religious purposes, either Muslim or non-Muslim, was prohibited from being worn on the streets outside the scope of religious practice. The intention of the law with respect to the Jews was that the attire of the chief rabbi could only be used by the rabbi himself, while ordinary Jews were prohibited from wearing any attire signifying religious orientation. The decline in the authority of the Chief Rabbinate was also evident in appointments to fill the post, or rather the lack thereof. For over two decades up until 1953, the Jewish community had neither an elected chief rabbi nor an appointed one. Chief Rabbi Haim Nahum resigned from the office in 1921 due to internal conflicts within the Jewish community, with only Moše Becerano remaining to serve as deputy chief rabbi. After Becerano’s death in 1931, the Turkish government appointed no one to fill the post, leaving it vacant until 1953 when David Asseo was assigned chief rabbi. The Republican leadership aimed to weaken the central minority organizations such as the Chief Rabbinate for two reasons: first these central organizations resembled the Ottoman Millet system, and one of the basic paradigms of new Turkey was a rejection of the Ottoman legacy; and second, due to the past record of some minorities in working for the dismemberment of Anatolian lands, e.g. Greek Patriarchy, the existing central organizations were suspected of serving similar ends.

Turkey’s legal framework set forth the full equality of all its citizens regardless of differences of religion, sect, ethnicity, gender or class. In 1928, Turkish citizenship was specified with a special law acting as supplement to Article 88 of the Constitution. The law, no. 1312, set forth the blood (descent) principle as the basic paradigm of Turkish citizenship and excluded territorial specifications. Due to the low population levels of the 1920s, the law aimed at an inclusive definition of Turkish citizenship (Aybay, 1998: 40). Under the law, children of a Turkish citizen, whether a mother or father, were entitled to Turkish citizenship by birth regardless of where they were born.
Despite an inclusive understanding of citizenship in the law, the construction of modern citizenship supplemented the process of nation-building through a homogenization under the new category “Turk”; hence the “Turkification” of non-Muslim groups and their assimilation into Turkish language and culture. Since the major criterion for being a “Turk” was speaking Turkish during the Early Republican Period, the unity of language emerged as one of the fundamentals of nation-building. There were many groups, such as minorities, whose mother tongue was not Turkish. These minority groups spoke their own language, a marking point in their difference which became more obvious in the public sphere. Similarly, the Jewish minority continued to speak Ladino, but their community was no longer considered confined to the private sphere at a time when the definitions of public and private spheres were changing with the establishment of a new territorial and national state. Ladino became more conspicuous in the public sphere as a form of difference within that sphere, and hence more susceptible to the policies of homogenization and Turkification in line with the official nationalism targeting Turkish as the common tongue. In the 1920s this move for a common language provoked press criticisms, both explicit and acute, against Jews for speaking Ladino (Levi, 1998: 66). Moreover, a campaign called “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” (Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!) was organized specifically to make Turkish the language of minority groups.

The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign was launched in 1928 by a group of students at Istanbul University’s Faculty of Law. However, it very quickly spread to other segments of society through press endorsements and generated a mass reaction against minorities for their language differences. As part of the campaign, posters were hung on walls, bulletins were distributed on the streets and public declarations were made advocating that Turkish be spoken by Turkish citizens. There were even individual responses such as warnings to Jews to cease speaking Ladino in favor of Turkish in schools at all levels, on streets and on public conveyances such as buses, ships and trains.

The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign received the support of not only the Turkish-speaking masses but also intellectuals and leaders of the Jewish community such as Moiz Kohen (Tekinalp) and Avram Galanti (Landau, 1996). Speaking in Turkish was considered a sign of loyalty to the ideals of the republic, while speaking Ladino was thought to be an obstacle to the Jewry’s unification with society and integration with Turkish culture. Language differences were evaluated through the lens of the citizenship question and so in order to become full citizens, Jewish leaders exhorted their communities on the necessity to learn and use Turkish (Bali,
In order to facilitate the spread of Turkish amongst themselves, many associations were founded by the Jews towards this end, i.e. Türkçe Konuşturma Birliği (Union for the Turkish Language), Türk Dilini Yaygınlaşturma Komisyonu (Jewish Commission for the Dissemination of the Turkish Language), Kültür Birliği (Union for Culture), Türk Kültür Birliği (Turkish Culture Association), and Balat Türk Kültür ve Yardım Derneği (Association for Balat Turkish Culture and Aid).

Despite the encouragement of Jewish leaders, the campaign also caused a counter-reaction among Jews when some of them resisted learning and speaking the tongue of their adopted land. The tension between advocates of the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign and Jews who preferred speaking their own language led to a rise in legal charges filed against Jews under Article 159 of the Penal Code – the “Insulting Turkishness” clause – which allowed charges to be brought on the basis of any verbal or physical act judged to insult or denigrate Turkishness. Still, the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign can be considered successful in the sense that, albeit with some ups and downs, it lasted until 1940s, and through creating a consciousness of the Turkish language and Turkish citizenship, more Jews, especially younger ones, started to learn and speak Turkish. The 1934 Law on Surnames also helped spread the use of Turkish. Under the law, the use of titles such as Madame and Mösyö, previously a very common practice among non-Muslims, was prohibited. The law also had an impact on Jews as they adopted surnames which were easily pronounced in Turkish.

The 1931 program of the RPP included the definition of nation as a social and political whole formed by citizens united by a common language, culture and goal; there was no mention of ethnicity. This RPP definition can be characterized as civic nationalism. However, in practice the government’s stance deviated from civic nationalism, because non-Muslims were discriminated against and Turkishness was linked closely to Islam. Furthermore, the rise of racism in Europe in 1930s caused anti-Semitism to seep into domestic extreme-right movements. There was a rise in far-right publications carrying anti-Semitic writings. Anti-Semtitist allegations included charges of the threat international Jewry posed to the world order, the Jews’ dominance of Turkish trade, the exploitation of Turks by Jewish capital, and the betrayal of the Jews during the conquest of Istanbul (Levi, 1998: 34). These themes were also prevalent in the cartoon magazines of the 1930s and ’40s, which stereotyped Jews as rich, money-grubbing merchants living in Istanbul and speaking heavily accented Turkish, utterly lacking in affinity or loyalty to the nation, with money as
their master (Mallet, 1996). These anti-Semitic publications, most notably the ones of Cevat Rifat Atıhan and Nihal Atsız, were the chief cause of the anti-Semitic attacks on Jews living in Thrace (Bali, 1999a: 50).

The Thrace Incidents first began in Çanakkale, a province in southern Thrace, with Jews receiving unsigned letters telling them to leave the area. The letters wrote that then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and the Turkish government also wanted the Jews to leave Çanakkale. Rather than replying to the far-right, anti-Semitic accusations by way of counter publication, the Jewish elite preferred to write to Prime Ministry officials, but no response was forthcoming. This inaction has been blamed on the chronic indolence of the bureaucracy, and also that at the time the matter of verbal attacks on minorities was considered nothing unusual (Levi, 1998: 128).

On July 3, 1934, the anti-Semitic campaign that began with unsigned letters and extreme-right publications escalated into physical violence against the Jews. Jews living in the various provinces of Thrace such as Çanakkale, Edirne, Kırklareli and Tekirdağ were attacked and beaten, their houses and shops destroyed, and their goods stolen. Afterwards, most Jews were forced to sell off their remaining goods very cheaply. Jews who fled to Istanbul were settled in Balat by the Jewish community there. It is estimated that out of a total 15,000–20,000 Jews living in the Thrace region, fully half immigrated to Istanbul during and after the incidents. Although some of them remained in Istanbul, some others migrated from the metropolis to Palestine (Karabatak, 1996: 7; Levi, 1996: 10).

The Prime Ministry intervened in the incidents, and the local authorities suppressed the anti-Jewish violence and restored order and peace. The rightist press organs that provoked the incidents were shut down and charges filed against them. The governors and mayors of the provinces where the incidents occurred were removed from office. The government made a public declaration that there was no anti-Semitism in Turkey and that the anti-Semitism behind these events originated from abroad, specifically from Europe, and not from within Turkey’s borders (Toprak, 1996).19

The 1934 Thrace Incidents caused not only a mass Jewish migration to Istanbul and to Palestine from the region but also a rise of Zionism among Turkey’s Jews. The first domestic Zionist association, the aim of which was Jewish migration to Israel, was founded by a group of Jews in Istanbul in 1934, just after the incidents. (Bali, 1999b: 43). Especially after the rise of European anti-Semitism in the 1930s and ’40s, Zionism spread among Turkey’s
Jews. Although Zionism was constitutionally restricted and the state barred dual loyalty among minorities, aiming instead at their full integration into the Turkish nation, the authorities did not persecute Zionist activities (Bali, 2001a: 60). However, the 1938 Law on Associations (No. 3512) brought restrictions on associations with connections outside Turkey. Under this law, associations operating as local branches of international groups were banned. Consequently, Jewish associations such as B’nai B’rith were closed down. Additionally, any community associations, foundations or sports clubs bearing foreign names were given new Turkish ones.

During World War II, the policies of the Turkish government on minority issues were largely dominated by the paradigm of national security and defense. The state’s prime concern was to not get involved in the war, but with the proviso that if war proved unavoidable, Turkey should be economically and militarily strong enough to defend itself. The economy was prioritized not only for the welfare of society – which fell sharply due to the war atmosphere – but also for supporting military readiness. Within this context, minorities were considered untrustworthy elements of society. In addition, since under the national security and defense paradigm they were to be pacified, the militaristic and economic measures had unforeseen consequences for the non-Muslim minorities.

As part of these militaristic measures, in 1939 it was decided that minorities serving in the military or due for conscription would not be given arms training but would instead be enlisted in support services. This decision was in effect until the end of the war, in 1945 (Nahum, 2000: 222). In their recruitment, desegregation was the active principle – that is, although non-Muslims were present in the support services, they worked alongside Muslim soldiers. It was only in 1941 that a principle of segregation was applied when non-Muslim men age 26 to 45 were recruited to the military as reserve forces. This special recruitment is known as the Incident of Reserves (Yirmi Kur’a İhtiyatlar), and is significant for the history of non-Muslims in Turkey not only for forming a reserve force composed solely of non-Muslims, but also because this reserve force was set up solely to serve a particular support branch which had been disarmed and deployed for civic purposes such as building national parks and roads and collecting garbage. Non-Muslim men recruited to this special reserve force were distressed at being gathered under a special branch segregated from Muslim soldiers at a time when concentration camps were in widespread use by racist regimes in Europe. However, the main concern of the Turkish government and the military was not to constitute a racist tool with this reserve force but rather to maintain national security by
isolating society’s “untrustworthy” elements in camps at a time when the war had already spread close to Turkey’s borders and was drawing nearer (Bali, 1998b). The non-Muslim soldiers served the military as reserve forces for nearly a year and were released from duty in 1942. As for the professional military cadres, during World War II the military academies set forth “being of the Turkish race” as an eligibility requirement for admission (Bali, 2000: 410).

As part of the economic measures taken during World War II, the Law on Capital Tax (Law No. 4305) was issued in 1942. The Capital Tax was a special one-time tax designed to provide additional resources for the Treasury and to discourage war economy market speculation and profiteering (Ökte, 1987: 24). During those years a number of basic goods such as oil, flour, sugar and gasoline were scarce, with their supply in the control of group of merchants who frequently used speculation to inflate market prices. In the eyes of the public, merchants and traders were corrupt businessmen, and successful non-Muslims merchants – more specifically the Jews – suffered from this negative stereotype. In response to the dominance of non-Muslims in the trade sector, state authorities tried to weaken their position with the Capital Tax. The tax also aided the rise of a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie under state protection. The Turkish state curbed non-Muslims minorities and redistributed their capital to other sectors of society so as to create a national bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1989).

There were four groups taxed under the law: Muslims, non-Muslims, converts and foreigners. Using categories set forth according to these groups, Tax Assessment Boards made up of governmental, commercial and local authorities from each city, town or district were formed to calculate the tax bill owed by individuals in that region. Per the tax boards’ rulings, non-Muslims and converts were made to pay much higher taxes than other groups. In order to pay the tax, most non-Muslims were forced to sell off their property. It is estimated that 98% of the real estate owned by non-Muslims was either bought by individuals, mostly Muslim, or made the property of the state (Akar, 2000: 147). Those unable pay their taxes were sent to the Aşkale Work Camp in Erzurum, an eastern province, to construct roads and shovel snow under severe weather conditions. Since the tax rate for non-Muslims was higher than that of other groups and the local council decisions were biased against them, all of the people sent to the Aşkale Work Camp were non-Muslims. The Jewish Agency in Palestine did not condemn the Capital Tax as an anti-Semitic measure, noting instead that not only Jews but also other non-Muslim minority groups were being charged extra taxes (Bali, 2000: 424).
Capital Tax was abandoned in 1944 with a new law, no. 4530, ending the levies and forgiving former tax debts.

The Capital Tax is generally considered to have been a racist policy, and alongside the long tradition of tolerance shown towards Jews is regarded as an exception (Yetkin, 1996: 252). Still, it caused a number of Jews to emigrate from Turkey, and their capital was transferred to the Muslim bourgeoisie.

The Multi-party Democracy Period (1945–1980): more democracy for a shrinking Jewish minority

During the Early Republican Period, Turkish modernization was formulated and moderated by the RPP and the Kemalist elites under single party rule. It was also the period of the establishment of the national-territorial state (Karpat, 1991). As for the non-Muslims and Jews specifically, the Early Republican Period was generally a period of pressure for nation-building and Turkification. The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign, national legislation designed to form a homogeneous citizenship, efforts to establish a national bourgeoisie and finally the Capital Tax were all instruments of the Turkification project, and all can be considered special tools of the general “top-down” tradition during the Early Republican Period.

Turkish politics’ transition to multi-party democracy occurred in 1945 when new parties were allowed to be founded and to compete in national elections. The most influential party in the early stages of multi-party democracy was the Democrat Party (DP). The 1950s witnessed the clash of the DP and the RPP but due to wartime shortages and profiteering, social unrest resulted in the DP’s victory in the national elections of 1950, ’54 and ’57, and it ruled the country until 1960, the year of the first military intervention in the history of modern Turkey.

The DP’s program promising equality and freedom attracted most of the non-Muslim minority vote as well (Bali, 1998a: 173). Most Jews voted for the Democrat Party (DP) in the 1946 general elections in protest of the Capital Tax imposed by the ruling RPP (Akar, 2000). In addition, the number of non-Muslim deputies in Parliament rose under DP rule. However, although the political climate during DP rule favoured Jews more than in previous years, nearly half of the existing Jewish population migrated to Israel with its foundation in 1948. Therefore, the Multi-Party Democracy Period can be considered an era of relaxation of the Turkification policies, though there were then fewer Jews present to make use of this relative freedom.

The aftermath of the war climate and the introduction of the DP into Turkish politics ushered in a more liberal environment for
Jews and other non-Muslim minorities. As of 1945 non-Muslims could be admitted to military academies, and they began to be recruited to the professional cadres of the Turkish military (Bali, 2000: 489). The Jewish press also saw a leap in both its variety and number. Many newspapers and journals such as Şabat, Şalom, Atikva, Or Yehuda, Or Israel and La Boz De Turkiya began to be published in Turkish, French or Ladino. The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign ended. However, the steps taken during the Early Republican Period towards nation-building yielded the projected results. For instance, the adoption of Turkish names and the use of Turkish as a language spread among the Jewry, and the early 1960s saw Turkish become the mother tongue of Turkey’s Jews (Şaul, 2001: 158). Language use became to be differentiated more by generation. In the new situation, by 1970s, for the vast majority of middle-aged Jews, the norm became to use Ladino at home, Turkish in the street (Şaul, 2001: 159). Older generations spoke Ladino more in contrast to younger generations who started to speak mainly Turkish.

In contrast to the strict exclusion of Islam from the public sphere during the Early Republican Period, the DP legitimized Islam and rural values. The DP coming to power signified the victory of a periphery made up of grassroots and the counter-official culture (Mardin, 1990). This development not only shook the balance of the traditional Ottoman-Turkish polity, which had hitherto followed a policy of strengthening the centre against the periphery for the sake of a strong state, but also provoked unintended consequences with respect to non-Muslims.

The Early Republican Period saw efforts to suppress Islamic identity through the lens of the state’s project of secularization and modernization, but being Muslim remained one of the essential criteria of Turkishness. The resurgence of Islam during DP rule did not alter the basic condition of Turkishness, and Islam was still considered one of the characteristics of Turkish identity. However, in the 1950s, as Islam came to be more frequently used as a social and cultural touchstone for politics, and religious liberties began to be practiced more in the public sphere, non-Muslims felt a lessening in the pressure to secularize. By the same token, they were able to make the most of their communal rights, which were defined in close relation to religious rights. This trend was confirmed for Jews in 1953, with first appointment to the Chief Rabbinate since the foundation of the republic. In this regard, it can be argued that non-Muslims were part of the periphery. Similar to the countryside, which was suspected as being separatist due to several rebellions (i.e. Kurdish and Islamic ones) against the Turkish state in the 1920s and ’30s, non-Muslims were also
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consigned to the periphery with similar suspicions cast on them due their past history in the National War of Independence. The centralist policies of the RPP therefore not only set limitations on Islam transgressing the public sphere but also restricted other religious groups within society. When the DP articulated Islam in politics and facilitated the periphery, such as rural masses, becoming a medium of power against state elites, then non-Muslims, as elements of the periphery, also found a more liberal environment for their communal identities.

However, with respect to the definition of nation and the building of the Turkish nation, analogous changes failed to materialize. During the Early Republican Period, nation-building and secularization were complimentary parts of Turkish modernization, and the construction of modern citizenship required Islamic identity to be curtailed. This indicated a complicated position for non-Muslim minorities. Although they were not Muslim and therefore had no Islamic identity to be curbed, they still fell outside the definition of the Turkish nation (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 177). The exclusion of non-Muslims from this definition continued during the DP period. It seems that though Islam was an issue to be dealt with in Turkish politics either in the form of prohibition or permission in the public sphere as well as a criteria for Turkishness both during the RPP and DP periods until the 1960s, the status of non-Muslims was more susceptible to the centre-periphery cleavage than was Islam. Therefore, setting the centre-periphery relation instead of Islam as an independent variable of the construction of citizenship provides an explanatory key to the changing milieu of non-Muslim citizenship in the 1950s.

The DP utilized populist policies, and in the emergence of the conflict over Cyprus with Greece in 1954, it frequently utilized nationalist discourse. The party adopted a hard-line foreign policy against Greece. This Cyprus conflict also had implications for domestic politics. The Greek minority living in Turkey was accused of taking sides with both Greece and the Greek Cypriots in anti-Turkish Cypriot violence on the island. In 1955, in the wake of the burning in Salonika of the house where Atatürk was born, the DP’s propaganda against Greeks both in Greece and in Turkey itself grew even harsher. In consequence, on September 6–7, 1955, anti-Greek violence over the Cyprus dispute erupted in Istanbul and İzmir, and then spilled over to Jewish-owned businesses.

Other non-Muslims groups such as Armenians were also threatened. Some people swayed by both nationalist rhetoric and their sensitivity over Cyprus went on to assault non-Muslims, putting the torch to their shops, attacking minority schools, insulting NATO-commissioned Greek officers on the streets of İzmir, and
burning down the residence of the Orthodox patriarch. There were some 100 injuries. The government paid compensation to the victims of the violence in Turkey. The September 6–7 Events constituted one of the major causes behind non-Muslim migration from Turkey to foreign countries in the 1960s. Hence, as the Greeks immigrated to Greece, the Jews immigrated to Israel.26

Sensitivity on the Cyprus issue and the attack on Atatürk’s house were not the only reasons behind the September 6–7 Events; the hostility towards non-Muslims that developed in the 1950s among the Islamic and nationalist right was also a factor (Bora, 1995: 39). The seed of this reaction against non-Muslims dates back to Ottoman times. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, when the Ottoman Empire was clearly in decline, in negotiations over international pacts such as the 1856 Treaty of Paris, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and the Treaty of Sevres in 1918, the issue of the status of non-Muslim communities was always a key issue. In view of this, the widespread belief that imperial Western powers used the minority issue as a tool during international negotiations to weaken Turkey gained currency among the rightists. In the September 6–7 Events, the view that “untrustworthy, alien elements within Turkish society are being aided by foreign powers” resurfaced.27 However, in subsequent years the damage done to civilians was compensated by the government.

With respect to the Jews, the hostility towards “alien elements within the nation” was reflected as anti-Semitism and throughout the 1950s and ’60s, the view that non-Muslims were outsiders exploiting Turkey through reaping huge profits in domestic trade and then moving this money to foreign investments maintained its dominance among rightists (Demir and Akar, 1994).28 Even more, some extreme rightists established associations to combat Zionism such as İzmir’s “Association for Combating Zionism in Turkey” established in 1968 (Bali, 1996). Throughout the 1950s while the latitude of citizenship was widened by political liberties at the social level, doubts about the loyalty of minorities persisted provoking questions on their citizenship.

The 1960 coup d’état brought DP rule to an end. The party was closed down and some of its leaders were tried and executed. The Constituent Assembly composed of representatives from various civic organizations and military commanders gathered to draw up a new constitution. Also included in the Constituent Assembly group were a single representative from each recognized minority group – one Armenian, one Greek and one Jew. The 1961 Constitution promoted a democratic environment by creating an effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of the elected assemblies as well as by strengthening the Council of State.
sustaining the independence of the judiciary, granting autonomy to universities, and enhancing civil liberties and social rights. Since the foundation of the republic, all citizens had been equal before the law; citizenship rights were granted from above without public deliberation; and citizens were bound to the state on the individual level regardless of their cultural, religious or ethnic affiliation. With the 1961 Constitution, the scope of citizenship was expanded and the basic elements of civil society – such as the right to organize and the freedoms of the press, public speech and political participation – were safeguarded. The new Constitution also allowed a freedom of association which resulted in an increasing number of organizations, including religious ones (Toprak, 1988). It limited the interference of the state in the affairs of individuals and aspired for a more liberal understanding of citizenship in comparison to the “devoted” citizen of the Early Republican Period (Soyarık, 2000: 156). A new form of citizenship, one more participatory and active, took shape though still maintaining the constitutional emphasis on duties to the state such as voting, paying taxes and doing military service (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 177). Despite the fact that the new Constitution extended the grounds of political participation through enhancing it, it is noteworthy that from the 1960s onward no non-Muslim deputy took a seat in Parliament for over 30 years.29

The 1961 Constitution laid out the specifics of Turkish citizenship in Article 54 (Gözübüyük, 1995: 131):

“Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. The citizenship status of a child born from a foreign father and a Turkish mother will be arranged by law. Citizenship is acquired and lost under the circumstances defined by law. No Turk can be expelled from citizenship, unless s/he engages in activities contrary to the loyalty to the country. The decisions and implementations of expulsion can be subject to appeal.”

In 1964, a new Citizenship Law, no. 403, was put into effect.30 This law was an amendment to Law No. 1312 according to the general framework on citizenship laid out by the 1961 Constitution. This new law, like its predecessor, also emphasized the blood principle. The law, which is still in use today, set forth three basic principles (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1964) Everyone should have a citizenship; 2) Everyone should have single citizenship; 3) Everyone should be free to choose their own citizenship and no one should be forced to hold a citizenship they do not want.31

The law regarded citizenship as unique, disclaiming dual citizenship. The underlying assumption of this premise seems to be the idea that citizenship means loyalty to the state, so loyalty to
more than one state is not viable. Revocation of Turkish citizenship, for instance, was designed as a response to activities putting one's loyalty to the state into question. Loyalty to the state was perceived as a requirement of national security (Soyarık, 2000: 162). As discussed above, loyalty to the Turkish state was one of the parameters of non-Muslim citizenship. Therefore, although the 1961 Constitution and 1964 Citizenship Law set forth a more specified citizenship that enhanced the sphere of the individual vis-à-vis the state, the emphasis laid on loyalty in these legal documents maintained the burden on Jews of demonstrating their loyalty to the state.

The rights and liberties defined by the 1961 Constitution led not only to a participatory citizenship but also promoted a more active civil society. In addition, however, in the late 1960s and early '70s rightist and leftist groups came to confront each other more and more, leading to an alarming rise in political violence. The Justice Party, established as an heir to the shuttered DP, was the ruling party during the '60s. In a reflection of the old cleavage between the centralist bureaucratic elite and the forces of the periphery which commanded an electoral majority, both civilian bureaucrats and the military distrusted the Justice Party and in response to its failure to rein in political terrorism, in 1971 the military intervened for the second time in modern Turkish history. As a result, constitutional amendments were enacted to strengthen the executive and limit the activities of citizens so as to safeguard national security and unity.

With respect to relations between non-Muslims and the state, the conjecture of the '70s was mainly dominated by the Cyprus issue. With the rise of violence on the island in 1964, Ankara withdrew from the 1930 Turkish-Greek Agreement. The agreement, whose strong advocates at the time included Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, aimed at economic cooperation between the two countries. It also regulated the status of Greek citizens living in Turkey with generous residence permits as a gesture of friendship between the Greek and Turkish nations. After the agreement was terminated in 1964, the Turkish government revoked the residence permits of Greek citizens living in Turkey and had them deported.32 The rising nationalism due to the Cyprus conflict put pressure on the Greek minority, leading most of them to migrate to Greece (Demir and Akar, 1994). In 1974 the Cyprus issue flared into an international crisis with the entrance of the Turkish military on the island to protect the Cypriot Turks. For its intervention, Turkey was faced with international pressure in the form of an arms embargo, diplomatic crises and accusations of human rights violations. Turkey's Jewish elites, who had been exerting constant efforts to prove their
community’s loyalty to the Turkish state, launched lobbying campaigns to defend Turkey in the international arena (Başak, 1995: 153).

In the same decade, the issue of religious foundations arose as a sphere of control over minorities. Under Article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne, non-Muslims were already granted the right to establish their own religious foundations. But in 1936, with Law on Religious Foundations No. 2762, the Turkish government undertook to treat those foundations on the same basis as Muslim ones. Furthermore, since the Civic Law outlawed the establishment of any religious foundation designed to support the members of any race or community, the Law on Religious Foundations, which desegregated the status of minority foundations with other foundations, disclaimed the establishment of new foundations by minority groups. The Law on Religious Foundations also urged foundations to prepare a declaration of properties they owned at the time. However, in 1974, the Council of State decreed that no corporate body constituted by non-Turkish citizens would be allowed to obtain immovable property (Cunhuriyet Dergi, 1999). Consequently, governmental authorities began to liquidate real estate belonging to the religious foundations of minorities. The official confiscation was based on the declaration of properties made in 1936. All the properties declared on the 1936 listing were considered the true property of a given foundation. On the other hand, properties acquired from that date up to 1974 either through donation or purchase were considered illegal. These properties were returned to the heirs of those who had first donated them and if no suitable heir could be found, they were confiscated. Post-1936 property purchases were confiscated outright (Oran, 2001: 229). The liquidation of these non-Muslim assets hindered the services that they provided to their communities, i.e. religious, educational and charity services, because most of them depended on the revenues earned from rents of the properties.

The 1970s was also a period when the traditional centre-periphery split started to give way to a functional cleavage (Özbudun, 1988). Class relations started to dominate the polity. The voters adopted more autonomous and instrumentalized criteria in most developed western regions and metropolitan areas (Kazancıgil, 1994). In a way, as a result of rapid urbanization, construction of shantytowns and changes in the socio-economic outlook of the country in general, the scope and content of groups forming the periphery was altered, a development which left its mark on the political parties as well. The Justice Party veered more to the right, and the RPP more to the left. At the same time, political terrorism was also becoming more violent in the late 1970s,
causing an ideological polarization of society. The non-Muslim minorities suffered the insecure environment with their Muslim counterpart but the attacks of the ASALA on Turkish institutions and embassies were additional sources of tension for Turkey’s Armenian minority.

The Post-1980 Period: Jews vis-à-vis globalization process

Due to the political violence between leftist and rightist groups as well as the fragmentation and polarization of society during the 1970s, the Turkish military intervened in politics in 1980 for a third time to forestall the erosion of state authority. Stringent measures were taken, such as strict control of the media, universities and the bureaucracy. All the existing political parties were closed down and their leaders banned from politics.35 In 1982, the military regime replaced the 1961 Constitution with a new one. The 1982 Constitution aimed at a major restructuring of Turkish democracy to prevent any recurrence of the recent domestic crises (Heper, 1990b). Under the new Constitution, the executive was strengthened, the powers of high courts reduced, the universities centralized, and the National Security Council given more authority. The procedural rules of politics were tightened – e.g., political parties were banned from organizing in foreign countries – and there were restrictions put on their women and youth branches. The Constitution brought strict limits to individual rights as well. It limited the rights of labour and other interest groups and barred trade unions, associations and cooperatives from engaging in political activities.

The military at that time viewed Islam as the antidote to the extremism of the late 1970s, and so wielded it as a tool for promoting social and political stability as well as societal unity (Bora and Can, 1991). In line with this conception, the military advocated a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, a rightist position which presumed that Turkishness and Islamism were complimentary aspects of Turkish culture and furthermore emphasized religious values in the fabric of Turkish nationalism (Bora, 1995). This synthesis leaned in favour of cultural Islam rather than political Islam. Hence, Islam started to take its place as a resource in public policies (Heper, 1991). The foremost policy change took place in the arena of education. Mandatory religion courses with a content based on Islamic ethics and the Sunni sect were introduced into the curriculum of primary schools (Öniş, 1997). It was only in 1987 that Christians and the Jews were excused from these lessons, and in 1990 they were completely freed from any obligation to participate in classes on religion or ethics (Franz, 1994: 333).
The 1980s were marked not only by the limitation of rights and freedoms brought by the new Constitution but also by the demilitarization and civilianization of the regime (Evin, 1994). In the competitive elections held in 1983, the Motherland Party (MP) – a group bringing together conservative, nationalist, social democratic and liberal wings under its roof – won a large majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, leading it to rule for the rest of the decade. The party brought significant changes to the economy and politics, ones similar in nature to the other contemporary neorightist waves in other Western countries. The MP replaced the import substitution economic policy with a free market model based on export-oriented growth. The liberal strategies of the MP aimed at Turkey’s economic integration with global capitalism. The MP combined engineering pragmatism with cultural conservatism, and all its policies emphasized traditional values, economic development and the entrepreneurial spirit of individuals (Toprak, 1993). In addition, in line with the dominant Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the time, rises were seen in religious sentiments, publications and education alike (Salt, 1995).

Besides these internal developments, the Post-1980 Period was also characterized by globalization. The domain of intertwining politics and economics overtook the conventional nation-state and brought international networks and realms to the fore. The people’s expectations about what the state ought to deliver grew, even as the state’s ability to provide these much-needed services was rapidly falling (Öniş, 1997). Homogenization went hand-in-hand with fragmentation across and within societies, leading to a rise in nationalist movements and ethnic conflicts as well as transnational movements such as feminism, environmentalism and Islamist fundamentalism. These movements, known under the blanket term identity politics, were also felt in Turkey. Besides the rise of Kurdish nationalism which took on violent expression as terrorism and reactionary Turkish nationalism, Turkey witnessed the rising Islamist movement. Hence the Welfare Party, with its Islamist worldview, gained prominence in various national and local elections during this period.

With respect to citizenship, the 1980s saw increasing consciousness of this concept. Although the MP’s liberalism conception lacked a concrete definition of citizenship encompassing individualization as in the West and was instead taken merely as an easy way to get rich (Göle, 1996), its policies such as privatization, transferring funds to municipalities, and development of the market economy served to indirectly strengthen civil society (Heper, 1990a). With its close relationship with the development of civil society, the increasing consciousness of citizenship pointed...
to contradictory trends in precisely this sphere. Citizenship, as an instrument within the domain of democracy and civil society and not of the state, entered the public agenda in the Post-1980 Period. The rise of civil society was accompanied by a shift from state-centred modernization imposed from above to a more civil society-centred modernization coming from below (Göle, 2000).

In the interface between citizenship and globalization, two issues concerning citizenship marked the Post-1980 Period. The first was dual citizenship and the legislation having to do with it. Against the changing contexts of globalization driven primarily by international migration, the existing laws on citizenship were inadequate. Before 1981, Turkey did not allow dual citizenship and its citizenship laws primarily emphasized the blood principle. However, due to extensive labour emigration to European countries, the Turkish state felt the need to alter the citizenship laws in accordance with trends in international migration, especially with regard to second- and third-generation émigrés. Therefore, in 1981’s Dual Citizenship Law – Turkish Citizenship Law No. 2383 – the basic principle was loyalty to the state rather than the nation. Theoretically, dual citizenship refers mainly to membership to more than one state, and the concept presupposes loyalty to the state rather than the nation. Therefore, this law on dual citizenship illustrated the tendency to prioritize loyalty to the Turkish state rather than the Turkish nation. In consequence, besides the blood principle, which is also generally preferred by other migrant-exporting countries, Turkey stressed the legal aspect of citizenship so as to permit émigrés to qualify for naturalization without giving up their original citizenship (İçduygu et al. 1999: 198). The Dual Citizenship Law not only impacted Turkish émigrés in European countries but also Jewish migrants from Turkey to Israel and returnees from Israel back to Turkey.

Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 was amended in 1995 with a supplemental law, No. 4112, to further encourage dual citizenship. Under this law, people naturalized in foreign countries prior to 1981 when dual citizenship was not allowed were granted the same set of rights as Turkish citizens, among which were property, inheritance, settlement and travel. The challenges posed by the rise of civil society and the complexity of international migration demonstrated that the conventional understanding of the nation-state was under challenge by globalization. As the artificial link between the nation and state started to break down, definitions of community based on blood and soil began to lose their power. Specifically in Turkey, the attempt to deal with these challenges was found in new legislation on dual citizenship, laws which can justifiably be
interpreted as the liberalization of citizenship policies (İçduygu et al., 1999: 203).

The second issue in the interface between citizenship and globalization was the discussion on constitutional citizenship that occurred specifically in the 1990s. In response to the rise of identity politics, multiculturalism, and demands from different segments of society (i.e. Islamists, Kurds, etc.), constitutional citizenship was proposed as a solution which would ensure internal peace in academic and political party circles (Soyarık, 2000: 202). In constitutional citizenship, the constitution represents a kind of social contract safeguarding the recognition of different ethnic and religious groups whose loyalty to the state would supersede the principle of loyalty to the nation (İçduygu, 1996). Although constitutional citizenship was suggested primarily as a possible solution to the Kurdish problem or the Islamic question, it also had implications for non-Muslim minorities. These discussions on constitutional citizenship helped to enlarge the domain of belonging to the nation and to curb down exclusion via the definition Turk.

The post-1980 period saw a sharp rise in publications put out by non-Muslim minorities discussing their communal identities such as community newspapers and journals. The most widely known publications today are Agos (by Armenians), Ogni (Lazes); and Şalom (Jews). There was also a proliferation of other publications, research, and websites addressing a wide-ranging audience of both academics and laypeople. Although since Turkey’s foundation non-Muslims had had self-published newspapers and journals addressing their closed communities, the post-1980 publication wave differed with its emphasis on communal identity and assertions of the preservation and promotion of ethno-religious cultures.

The surge of publications by and about non-Muslim minorities signified a rise of public interest in both differences and identities. It also confirmed the relevance of issues of difference and equality to the growing debates throughout the 1990s on loyalty to the nation/state and Turkish citizenship alike. In this regard, the simultaneous occurrence of debates on constitutional citizenship and on the status of non-Muslims cannot be mere coincidence. As differences within society became more visible and therefore more publicly discussed, debates on how to deal with this host of ethnic, linguistic and religious differences inclined and tended to centre around citizenship, with a focus on what the fundamentals of Turkish citizenship should be. Retrospective criticisms arose by the non-Muslims as well as by several others regarding the past discriminatory acts against the non-Muslims. The most important discussion in the ’90s about non-Muslims centred on the Capital Tax.
The debate was spurred by “Salkım Hanımın Taneleri” (The Jewelry of Ms. Salkım), a historical film based on a novel by Yılmaz Karakoyunlu which many saw in both movie theatres and on television. The film concerned the impact of the Capital Tax on one Armenian family, some of whose members were forced to sell off their property just in order to pay the tax, and others who ended up being sent to the Aşkale Work Camp. In these discussions, minorities’ loyalty to states other than Turkey was also questioned and certain criteria were set unofficially to resolve conflicting identities and loyalties. The Cyprus issue was considered the breaking point for the Greek minority, just as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict served the same purpose for the Jews and the Armenian genocide issue for the Armenians.

For the Jews, the influence of identity politics could be traced back to the surge in studies and publications on Turkish Jewry from the '90s into the next decade. In line with the general tendency to celebrate differences, the Jewish community emphasized its religious identity but without going so far as to exclude a pre-eminent Turkish culture and identity in the formation of this identity. These publications and studies focused mainly on the tolerance granted to the Jewish community both by the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic and the loyalty that the Jews felt in return (Emecen, 1997: 10). Although in various publications Islamists frequently deployed anti-Semitic propaganda against the Jews (i.e., allegations of an Jewish-Freemason conspiracy manipulating states across the globe, Jews exploiting the resources of countries where they live, or Israel being the “devil” of the Middle East), still it is generally argued by both the Jewish elite and state officials that anti-Semitism in Turkey is nearly nonexistent (Bali, 2001a: 16). Even the 1984 bombing of the Neva Shalom Synagogue, which left a death toll of 23, was blamed on foreign elements and anger over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the bomber was an Arab (Franz, 1994: 329). Two more synagogues were bombed in November 2003. Similarly, these recent bombings were more related to the bombing of the Twin Towers in U.S.A known as 9/11 Incident.

The Jews’ insistence on demonstrating their loyalty and at the same time pursuing a cultural politics based on religion was underlined in 1989 with the establishment of the Quincentennial Foundation (Bali, 2001b). With their strong ties to American Jews, Turkish Jewry has lobbied on the international stage since the 1970s to refute the Armenian genocide allegations and to support the Turkish position on Cyprus. With the Quincentennial Foundation, this Jewish community role continued under an institutional framework. The foundation’s original aim was to celebrate the
welcome that Jewish refugees found in the Ottoman Empire, but it also served to bolster Turkey’s image in the face of damaging accusations of human rights violations and the like (Bali, 2001a: 309).

As mentioned above, the post-1980 rise of civil society and the development of a consciousness of citizenship both as legal status and identity served together to illustrate a paradox in light of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and limitations of the 1982 Constitution. In the case of Jews, these contradictory trends pointed to a further paradox. On the one hand, Jews became more visible in the public arena by virtue of the public interest in differences within society as well as the Jews’ pursuit of identity politics. This trend was accompanied by discussions of citizenship. Yet on the other hand, political and cultural Islam became more hegemonic in the public sphere. This trend was accompanied in the 1990s by a rise in anti-Semitic rhetoric making its mark in Turkish politics, especially on the part of Islamists. These conflicting trends can be understood by examining globalization and its inspiration upon the global and local. The global endorses a universal concept of citizenship with its attendant basic rights and freedoms and calls attention to the legal aspect of citizenship. The local, however, substantiates an understanding of citizenship based upon differences and therefore reinforces the identity aspect of citizenship. The local lacks uniform characteristics and so in the process of celebrating and authenticating differences, multiple identities of the local come into view. In the post-1980 zeitgeist, though Islamic identity and Jewish identity have sometimes come into conflict, they actually go hand-in-hand.

The European Union also construed yet another important aspect of the process of globalization and its reflections in Turkey. The 1993 Copenhagen summit of the EU Council affirmed that before its accession a candidate country must have achieved a stable democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. In the council’s conclusions from that summit, one sine qua non condition set out for the accession of candidate states was the protection of minorities. Under the so-called Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries had to satisfy standards related to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Detailed articulation of standards for minority protection was left to the progressive implementation of the accession partnership documents reached between the EU and its various candidate countries. In addition, progress reports were released annually on the efforts made by candidate countries to meet the accession requirements. In Turkey’s Accession Partnership Document, priority was given to
enhancing the linguistic and cultural rights of minorities. Turkey, as a candidate country, was tasked with satisfying minimal standards of protection within the national system. Starting in 1998, the EU Commission’s annual reports also monitored Turkey’s progress in protecting minorities and included comprehensive assessments of the prevailing state of minority treatment. These reports insisted that the Assyrian, Alawite and Kurdish groups be officially recognized, along with the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, and necessary legislation be enacted in order to promote and protect the distinct identities of these Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. Towards this end, the reports urged Turkey to adopt constitutional amendments to integrate with EU standards on minority protection.

Turkey’s EU Accession Partnership Document compelled it to review the prevailing minority regime whose basics were originally set out in the Treaty of Lausanne. Historically, the minority issue has been a sensitive issue for Turkey both domestically and internationally. In the latter, the minority issue was considered a springboard for foreign powers to interfere in Turkey’s domestic affairs and hence threaten its sovereignty. In the former, the issue was seen through the lens of national security in response to secessionist pressures. But in the 1990s, with the accession requirements, Turkey faced the question of how to preserve its national and territorial integrity while also recognizing the ethno-linguistic and religious diversity present within society. The rise of identity politics, demands for cultural rights, and debates on constitutional citizenship all contributed to EU accession process pressures on Turkey vis-à-vis changing the minority regime. In the ’90s, although Turkey continued to resist enlarging the existing framework of minority rights, the standards required by the EU came to be recognized within the context of individual rights and freedoms. In 2002, major constitutional amendments were introduced. Accordingly, it became legal to do broadcasts in both minority languages and dialects used traditionally by many Turkish citizens in their daily lives. Although the official language of education in the schools remained Turkish, special courses for different languages and dialects were henceforth allowed. The Law on Religious Foundations was also amended. Foundations run by non-Muslim minorities were allowed to acquire and dispose of property. However, after the amendment was adopted, complications arose. Religious foundations run by non-Muslim minorities were allowed to register property that they actually used as long as they could provide proof of ownership. However, the procedures for registration were complicated and subject to frequent bureaucratic intervention. Furthermore, the amendment did not cover the authority
of the General Directorate of Foundations to dismiss the board of trustees. The amendment also failed to address the question of the already confiscated properties of non-Muslim foundations. The problems related to bureaucratic procedures were resolved with additional decrees in 2003.

With the last constitutional amendments made in accordance with European Union requirements in 2003, the establishment of new synagogues was also allowed. From the changes of the previous year, building synagogues or places of worship for non-Muslim believers was no longer legally prohibited, yet the Law on Public Works still covered only mosques, leaving out entirely other places of worship. That year the wording of the law was changed, replacing “mosques” in the phrase “in the public work plan, a place for mosques is reserved” with the ecumenical “places of worship.” These amendments taken to satisfy EU requirements, however, did not alter the policy of specifying the faith of individuals on their national identity cards. Today, Turkish identity cards still identify the religious affiliations of Turkish citizens.

In the post-1980 period, in addition to these steps taken, a first time event regarding Jewish minority occurred. After the death of David Asseo, the Chief Rabbi who was appointed in 1953, the Jewish community in Turkey held elections in October 2002 for the first time in the history of modern Turkey. It was a two-rounded election in which Jews over the age of 18 would vote for delegates composing the committee who would then elect the Chief Rabbi. Permission for elections was taken from the Ministry of Interior Affairs, according to Lausanne Treaty, and General Directorate of Security the Bureau of Minorities saw that the elections were executed in peace and order. The motto during the elections, as repeated frequently in Şalom weekly, was “Voting is a duty, candidacy is a right!” In result of the elections, İzak Haleva was chosen as the Chief Rabbi.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Citizenship in Turkey is one of the major instruments of nation-building in Turkey and the state had been the main determinant and actor in the development of citizenship (İçduygü et al. 1999). Inheriting the multicultural structure of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey had regarded citizenship as a means of governance of the relations between newly founded state and the cosmopolitan society. In addition to the complimentary role to nation-building, citizenship served as an instrument in modernization and establishment of modern roots to democracy, secular governance and integrated society despite its multicultural components.
Although Turkey is one of the new states founded in the Middle East in the first half of the 20th century, it has a strong centric state and a deep Republican tradition in its polity. Citizenship norms, consequently, safeguard Republican principles that prioritize social cohesion over individualistic aspirations and universal rights over group rights. Therefore, the group rights granted to the non-Muslim minorities in the Lausanne Treaty pose a challenge to the civic spirit of laws and policies. The development of citizenship in Turkey and the treatment of minorities is a good illustration of the dilemma between the principle of equality and the principle of difference that Turkey cannot refrain from but usually tended to opt for the former in accordance with its Republican tradition. In this sense, the Turkish case shows similarities with other Republican democracies like France in contrast to liberal, multicultural democracies like Canada.

This article highlighted on the history of the Jewish minority with a focus on citizenship. It discussed the citizenship of the Jews by getting use of the historical periods differentiated on the basis of contextual factors that shaped citizenship. The Early Republican Period (1923–1945) is generally marked with the foundation of the Turkish Republic and the taking root of Republican norms and values such as secularism, nationalism and unitary state structure. This period is also known as the Single-Party Period since the Republican People’s Party (RPP) was the sole party dominating the political agenda until the transition to multi-party democracy in 1945. The specific relevance of this period with respect to the Jewish minority is that its policies for building a Turkish nation-state and creating a Turkish citizenry were characterized largely by the homogenization of society under the term “Turk.” Therefore, this period is generally marked with the tension that arose during the inclusion of non-Muslim groups, and hence the Jews, under the definition of supra-Turk and a supra-Turkish citizenry.

The Multi-Party Period (1945–1980), however, indicates a more tolerant period in comparison to the Single-Party Period with respect to religious identities and its understanding of citizenship. It is a period during which the citizenship project entailed a broader range of civic rights under the 1961 Constitution. However, during its later stages, especially in the 1970s, these rights were curtailed by additional legislation in response to rising violence between leftist and rightist groups. The pressure of “Turkification” on the Jewish minority was reduced in the Multi-Party Period, but the social unrest of the 1970s impinged upon emigration to Israel, which did not take a mass form as it did post-1948, after the establishment of Israel.
The post-1980 period was significant for the Jews in terms of the impact of globalization and neo-liberal policies. The 1982 Constitution, one greatly influenced by the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, brought restrictions to basic rights and liberties. However, several trends — the development of civil society, the rise of identity politics, liberalization of the economy and the accession process to the European Union — all provided challenges concerning the minority issues and the concept of citizenship.

Although all three minority groups — the Armenians, the Greeks and the Jews — have different histories, the foundations of Turkish citizenship vis-à-vis the minorities and its evolution adhere to all three. Yet, the Jewish case is significant in its peculiarity that it is not considered as part of the traditional “minority problem” that Turkey is obliged to address. Furthermore, the Jewish case clearly shows that the construction and development of citizenship went hand in hand with the construction of modern nation-state.

In these constructions, the historical discussion of citizenship in the case of Jewish minority surfaces two points. First the emphasis given to the loyalty — either in the sense of loyalty to the state or loyalty to the nation — as a requirement of full citizenship despite the civic definitions in the laws. The Jewish community is perceived generally as a loyal minority group because of the fact that they were not involved in separatist activities neither in the Ottoman Empire nor in contemporary times in the Republic of Turkey. The Jews above all played an instrumental role in defying the claims of Armenian genocide in the international relations. Even more they were enthusiastic advocates of the claims that Turkish lands had been historically tolerant the Jews. Despite these illustrations of loyalty, the position of loyalty seems not to be secured as questions of minorities’ including the Jews’ disloyalty frequently are raised. The Israel-Palestine conflict, emigration of Jews’ to Israel and Zionism are all themes that bring forth questions of loyalty. In addition, although loyalty is an essential norm in Turkish citizenship, it is still an insufficient criterion to be considered “Turk”.

The second point is to do with Islam and religion. Turkey has a strong secular tradition in its polity. Islam and other religions in Turkey had always been tried to be strictly confined to the private sphere. Therefore, secularism in Turkey not only affected the Muslim majority but also the non-Muslim minorities. Secularism set a barrier in front of all religions to have access to the public sphere. By the same token, performance of religious identity in the public, i.e. wearing of religious gowns on the streets, exploiting religious symbols or values in political life, etc., were strictly banned. Therefore, the non-Muslim groups were not able to get use of their
special rights granted by the Lausanne Treaty to a full extent. For instance, they were not able to found new associations because according to the Law on Associations, associations to be founded on religious ground were prohibited. The Jews, for instance, were not able to wear kipah on the streets. However, when Islamic values start to get used in the public or when Islamic identity gets a higher hand in the political sphere, the other religions within the country, be it Judaism or Christianity, gain a similar momentum with respect to visibility in the public sphere. For instance, after the strict suppression of religion by the Republican People’s Party, the successor Democrat Party emphasized Islamic values and utilized a liberal discourse on religion in the 1950s. The relative liberal environment introduced by the DP also relaxed the position of the Jewish minority as it was able to appoint the Chief Rabbi. Similarly, when Islam re-entered the political life in the 1980s, other religions were also more comfortable to express themselves in the public. The minorities position vis-à-vis Islam and secularism is twofold, however. The category of Turk that Turkish citizenship rests on, despite civic definitions in the law, refers to Islamic identity and puts the non-Muslims in ontological periphery. Furthermore, also secularization curbs down the religious identity of the non-Muslims as well as the Jews, it also serves as a safeguard against the Islamic fundamentalism getting hold of the state. In other words, secularism guarantees the basic condition for the non-Muslims’ existence in Muslim majority society.

Notes

1 Sule Toktas is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations, Isik University, Turkey.
2 For discussions on politics of difference and radical democracy, see Mouffe (1992) and Young (1990).
3 For discussions on the problematic of equality/difference and on the questions of universal/differentiated citizenship, see Seyla Benhabib (1996).
4 The group rights reflected the official position for a minimalist understanding of who the minorities in Turkey are. For instance, other non-Muslim religious groups, e.g. Assyrians, who had not been included in the Ottoman Millet system, were denied any distinct minority status.
5 Since that time, there have been few revisions or additional pacts challenging the minority rights schema laid out by Lausanne, and even today, the treaty is considered the legal cornerstone structuring the general framework of issues related to non-Muslim minorities.
6 For a similar breakdown of Turkish politics into eras, see Özbudun (1988).
7 Lausanne also stipulated that the minority rights covered under Articles 37–44 were to be reciprocated by Greece and would be granted to the ethnic Turks living in western Thrace.
Article 38 of the Treaty of Lausanne states: “All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defense, or for the maintenance of public order.” Article 39 of the treaty states: “Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law. . . . Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts” (Hurewitz, 1956: 122).

Article 40 of the treaty states: “Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein” (Hurewitz, 1956: 122–123).

Some of the minority groups’ collaboration with the occupying forces during the time of the Independence War had already created hostility among the national elite as well as the society at large.

Article 42 of the treaty states: “The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities. These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to other private institutions of that nature” (Hurewitz, 1956: 123).

The Armenians opted out of Lausanne’s Article 42 on October 17, 1925 and the Greeks followed on November 27, 1925. It must be noted that the Treaty of Lausanne was signed by Turkey and the Allied Forces such as France, Britain, Italy, and Greece and was put under the guarantee of the League of Nations. Therefore, the three minority groups’ opting out of Article 42 does not hold any legal significance according to the norms of International Law.

Kosher is the term used for Jewish dietary laws.

Haim Nahum was in the Turkish delegation to the negotiations over Lausanne in 1923.
The Chief Rabbinate was not the specific institution to be weakened but the Greek Patriarchy. However, due to the equal treatment of all minority groups, the Jewish community institutions were put on equal footing with other minority groups. For a detailed analysis of the complexity of the Greek Patriarchy issue, see Macar (2003).

Article 1 of Law No. 1312 states: “Children born from a Turkish father or mother whether in Turkey or in a foreign country are considered Turkish citizens” (Nomer, 1989: 45).

With the same Law on Surnames, titles indicating a religious, tribal or societal class-rank difference such as sheikh or pasha were also banned.

Such a linkage between Turkishness and Islam was apparent in immigration policies as well. For instance, Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians in Konya were sent to Greece during the Greek-Turkish population exchange of 1923–24; in the mid-‘30s the government rejected immigration applications from the ethnic Turkish Romanian Christian Gagauz; but Muslims who migrated from the Balkans to Turkey during the same period were naturalized very swiftly. Moreover, although Turkey had declared that it would prioritize factors of Turkish language and ethnic affiliation but remained silent on the issue of religion, in practice immigrants from the Sunni or Hanefi sects of Islam were received more easily (Kırıçılı, 2000).

Research on the role of the central government in the Thrace Incidents is still ongoing.

The Law on Associations was amended in 2001.

The converts (dönme) are the followers of Sabetay Zvi who declared himself messiah in the mid-17th century in Ottoman Empire. The Rabbis at the time did not recognize him as a messiah and applied to the official authorities for his arrest. Sabetay Zvi was arrested for disrupting social order and was sentenced to death. However, he was also given the option of denying being the messiah and accepting Islam. He converted to Islam and his followers conformed to Islamic principles in the public sphere and to Judaic principles at home. This is why his followers are called Sabetay-ists or converts (dönmes). They are a closed group that continued their existence, though in very small numbers, until today’s Turkey. They do not belong to the Jewish minority as they are not considered Jews but a special belief.

Jewish immigrants holding German, Austrian, Romanian or Bulgarian citizenship were classified for tax purposes in the foreigners’ group.

The tax rate calculated on the basis of annual revenue earned was 5% for Muslims, 156% for Greeks, 179% for Jews and 232% for Armenians (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 376).

Sources differ on the number of non-Muslims sent to the Aşkale Work Camp. Akar (2000) estimates the number to be around 6,000–7,000. Yetkin (1996), on the other hand, estimates it at 2,057.

In the 1960 census, the Turkish literacy rate among the Jewry was 85% (Dündar, 2000: 63).

The integration of Turkey into the international migration regime in the 1950s made emigration to foreign countries easier. The 1950s and ‘60s were not only years when non-Muslims left Turkey, but also years of urbanization and industrialization which saw the beginning of migration from rural areas to urban ones and from eastern regions to western ones. Likewise, many Jews living in south-eastern provinces such
as Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır and Hakkari migrated to Israel in the early 1950s, and many living in the eastern province of Van migrated to Istanbul in the ’60s (Aydın, 1983: 511). According the 1965 census, 80% of Turkey’s total Jewish population lived in the metropolis of Istanbul (Dündar, 2000: 61).

27 Even in the debates in the 1980s and ’90s over Turkey’s application to join the European Union, the issue of minorities frequently resurfaced in a strikingly similar context – that is, the alleged interference of Western European Union powers in Turkey’s internal affairs and their using minorities to weaken its position in international relations.

28 Traditionally, the nationalist and Islamic extreme right in Turkey had been anti-Semitic and targeted not only Jews but also converts.

29 It was only in the 1995 elections that a Jew from the True Path Party (DYP) won a seat in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

30 This Law was published in the Official Gazette No. 11638 dated February 22, 1964.

31 Law No. 403 was amended in 1981 by Turkish Citizenship Law No. 2383 to allow dual citizenship.

32 It is estimated that around 30,000–40,000 ethnic Greek Turkish citizens emigrated to Greece after Turkey terminated the Turkish-Greek Treaty in 1964 (Aydın, 1983: 510).

33 Today, the legal prohibition against foundation of pious foundations on the basis of race or community in Civic Law is still in effect. It should be noted that this is not specific to non-Muslims; the same restrictions apply to Muslims and adherents of other faiths. However, there are debates to broaden liberties regarding pious foundations in the current Justice and Development Party government.

34 The provision prohibiting the acquisition of property by minority religious foundations remained in force until 2002, when it was removed under the pressure of the EU accession process.

35 With a referendum in 1986, the formerly banned politicians were able to return to politics.

36 As the neo-rightist wave was called Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganism in the United States, after its most prominent local proponents, it was called Özalism in Turkey after Turgut Özal, the leader of the Motherland Party.

37 All the cultural minority groups, including those not officially recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne, expressed themselves through a number of newspapers and journals.

38 Even in the Lausanne negotiations, in response to Western delegates’ insistence on the inclusion of the minority protection in the treaty, the Turkish delegates frequently stated that Jews have had long lived in peace in the lands of Turkey; they were not in pursuit of special group rights; and Turkey did not have a minority problem (Ürer, 2003: 231–255).

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